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ARTICLE
LAW AND PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD·
MYRES S. MCDOUGALt & SIEGFRIED WIESSNER:!:
Designs for peace among nations have abounded
throughout the course of history. The most successful plans
harnessed the self-interest of ruling elites in the communi-
ties of the world. Rational leadership was a crucial factor in
their success. Common global cooperation in minimizing
the use of violence was, and is, the most difficult goal to
achieve. It requires careful analysis of claims, claimants,
perspectives, identifications, and other contextual factors.
Cordell Hull was a master at that. Figures of no lesser stat-
ure than Franklin Roosevelt and Dean Acheson have called
him the "father" of the United Nations. He was, in a true
sense, not only "present at the creation" of a viable interna-
tional security system; he was greatly influential in shaping
it. He richly deserved the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to him
in 1945. The purpose of this article is to honor the memory
of Cordell Hull by analyzing the framework, policies and
moving factors in the process of authoritative decision-mak-
ing of the use of violence or persuasion on the global level,
as well as to present alternatives for its improvement.
• Professor Myres S. McDougal is the first recipient of the Cordell Hull Award,
bestowed upon this eminent scholar during the celebration of the centennial of
Cordell Hull's graduation from Cumberland School of Law on October 2, 1991.
Professor Siegfried Wiessner accepted the award on behalf of Professor McDougal
and delivered the Cordell Hull Lecture reprinted here in the format of an article.
The address features significant parts of McDOUGAL & WIESSNER, Law and Minimum
World Public Order, to be published in MYRES S.McDoUGAL & FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF WAR (forthcoming, New Haven Press, 1992).
Both authors drew freely, though with changes, upon McDougal, Law and Peace, 18
DEN.J. INT'L L. & POL'y I (1989), a preprint ofid., Law and Peace, ch. 6 of the United
States Institute of Peace publication ApPROACHES TO PEACE, AN INTELLECTUAL MAP
(W. Thompson & Kn.Jensen eds. 1991).
t Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School. B.A., M.A., LL.B., Uni-
versity of Mississippi 1927; B.A., B.C.L., Oxford University, England, 1930: J.S.D.,
Yale Law School, 1931.
t Professor of Law, S1. Thomas University School of Law. J.D. (Equivalent), Uni-
versity of Tiibingen, 1977; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1983; Dr. iur., University of
Tiibingen, 1989.
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I. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM
In traditional literature, intemationallaw is commonly di-
vided into a most imprecise dichotomy of "war" and
"peace." These words are characteristically employed to
make simultaneous reference both to the presence or ab-
sence of the facts of transnational coercion and violence and
to the legal consequences to be attached by the authorities
to different intensities of coercion and violence} The facts
are those of the global process of effective power in which
many different participants (state and other), for many vary-
ing objectives in expansion and conservation, employ all in-
struments of policy (military, diplomatic, ideological and
economic) in differing stages of intensity of violence and co-
ercion, in attack upon the bases of power (people, re-
sources, and institutions) of other participants, and are
themselves in turn the targets of attack. The legal policies
and sanctioning consequences that the authoritative deci-
sion-makers of the global community apply to the different
aspects of this continuous process of violence and coercion
vary with many particular problems. These problems may
be categorized in terms of the minimization of major coer-
cions, the conduct of hostilities, the termination of hostili-
ties, the regulation of minor coercions, and so on. In a first
effort to minimize major violence and coercion, authorita-
tive decision-makers seek through a law of "aggression" and
"self-defense," to prevent alterations in the existing distri-
bution of values among nation-states by processes of unilat-
eral and unauthorized coercion and to promote value
changes and adjustments by processes of persuasion or by
community-sanctioned coercion. When persuasive strate-
gies fail and violence and coercion break out, a second effort
is to reduce to a minimum the unnecessary destruction of
values by defining, with as much simplicity as possible, the
1 For a comprehensive review, see MYRES s. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICI-
ANO, LAw AND MINIMUM WORLD PuBLIC ORDER; THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COERCION (1961). See also W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War
System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. I (1973), reprinted in MYRES S. McDOUGAL
& W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAw ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 142 (1981); W. MICHAEL REISMAN &
JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS AND POLICIES
OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAw (forthcoming,
Yale Univ. Press, 1992); W. MICHAEL REISMAN & C. ANTONIOU, THE LAw OF WAR:
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (forthcoming, Vintage Books,
A Division of Random House, Inc., 1991).
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permissible maximum of violence and destruction in partic-
ular types of situations. Our inherited concepts of "peace"
and "war,"2 making such ambiguous reference to this vast
maze of facts and legal policies, have many times been docu-
mented as casting but a darkening light upon the difficult
problems in public order that presently confront
humankind.
It is suggested that a more relevant conception of peace
may be found through employment of contemporary no-
tions of world public order. A distinction is sometimes
made between "minimum order," in the sense of the mini-
mization of the unauthorized use of force, and "optimum
order," as the arrangements that provide the greatest access
of the individual human being to all of the values of human
dignity.3
However, both of these kinds of allegedly different public
order goals would appear to be indispensable to any worka-
ble conception of peace. Even when conceived in the mini-
mum sense of freedom from the fact and expectation of
arbitrary violence and coercion, peace seems increasingly
dependent upon maintaining people's expectations that the
processes of authoritative and effective decision will re-
spond to their demands for a reasonable access to all the
values we today characterize as those of human dignity.
When peace is more broadly conceived as security in posi-
tion, expectation and potential with regard to all basic com-
munity values, the interrelationship of peace and human
rights quite obviously passes beyond that of interdepen-
dence and approaches that of identity. Hence, there is
much in President John F. Kennedy's question "Is not
peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human
rights?"4
2 C/, e.g., RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS (1967).
3 MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF
HUMAN DIGNITY, ch. 5 (1980).
4 Address at the American University, June 10, 1963. See also James Toth, Human
Rights and World Peace, in I RENE CASSIN, AMICO RUM DISCIPULORUMQ..UE LIBER 362-82
(Institut International des Droits de I'Homme ed. 1969).
This integrative view of human rights and peace is echoed in the United Nations
General Assembly Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace of November 12,
1984. It, inter alia, "solemnly proclaims that the peoples of our planet have a sacred
right to peace," and "solemnly declares that the preservation of the right of peoples
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It may be generalized that the basic policies that underlie
contemporary conceptions of peace and human rights are
the same policies that, in any democratic community, under-
lie all law. Peace and law may appropriately be described as
one side of the coin (in community process and effective
power) of which arbitrary violence and coercion are the op-
posite side. A major goal of an intemationallaw of human
dignity must be to make the persuasion component of the
global process increasingly dominant over the coercive
component.
For the most perspicacious proponents of an optimum
public order, the realistic and immediate challenge is that of
introducing into the global process of effective power the
necessary, more collectivized, perhaps even more central-
ized, perspectives and operations of authority, sustained by
control. It is not to be assumed that humankind is limited in
choice to an anarchy of allegedly equal, independent, and
sovereign territorial communities or some fantasied
omnicompetent universal state with all its threats to the val-
ues of human dignity. The words federal, confederal, re-
gion, alliance, and coalition are primarily meaningful in
their suggestion of the infinite variety of potential modali-
ties in organization. The parts may be related to the whole
in many different, and changing ways to serve the purposes
of public order. The rearrangement of decision-making
structures in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia illustrates the
many possibilities.
Any effort toward improvement of world public order
must begin with the existing global process of authoritative
and controlling decision that is already collectivized in a
higher degree than many observers are aware. A brief his-
torical review of law and minimum world public order is
therefore apposite.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITATIVE PROJECTION OF
BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES
The earlier policies and procedures, developed under the
aegis of inherited theories about international law, for the
control of major coercion and violence, sometimes called
to peace and the promotion of its implementation constitUle a fundamental obliga-
tion of each State." G.A. Res. 39/11, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. 220 (1984).
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force, were most primitive.5 For some centuries there have
been reasonably observed policies for the protection of dip-
lomats and facilitation of diplomacy; for the making, appli-
cation, and termination of international agreements; for the
protection of nationals abroad from abuses by other states;
and for the peaceful settlement of disputes, as through con-
ciliation, mediation, and arbitration. With respect to the
more direct control of major coercions and violence, the
policies and procedures developed were far from being ade-
quate in aspiration and were much less consistently ob-
served. The most important effort to control major
coercion and violence, with roots reaching far back into the
Middle Ages, derived from a distinction between just and
unjust wars.6 The basic thrust of bellum iustum was that re-
sort to major violence could be regarded as legitimate self-
help only for certain objectives, such as redressing a re-
ceived wrong. This required a serious wrong commensurate
with the losses the war would cause and which could not be
repaired or avenged in any other way. The effective power
of the Papacy made possible some centralized administra-
tion of so general a concept of necessity and consequential-
ity. Yet even this modest effort to control major coercion
and violence fell before changes in community and effective
power processes in the eighteenth century. By the nine-
teenth century the requirement of bellum iustum was brought
to an unobtrusive demise.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, resort to
force came to be regarded as a prerogative of sovereignty,
the. legitimacy of which non-participating states were not
competent to judge. In the international law of the time
"war was the sport of princes and the privilege of states, and
could be undertaken for power, glory, revenge, or many rea-
5 MYRES s. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, supra note 1, chs. 1 & 3;
C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS, at 455 (1952).
6 In contrast to early Christian doctrines of pacifism, St. Augustine in 412 A.D. and
St. Thomas Aquinas in 1266-73 developed elaborate criteria for the "justness" of
wars. Cf ST. THOMAS AQ.UINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, vol. II, pertinent translation re-
printed in JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDERICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAw 53-54 (1990). See also JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION
AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQ.UIRY (1981); YEHUDA
MELZER, CONCEPTS OF JUST WAR (1975); WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST
AND LIMITED WAR (1981); Fredrick R. Struckmeyer, Just War and the Right of Self-De-
fense, 82 ETHICS 48 (1971); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL AR-
GUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977).
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sons beyond considerations of self-help."7 International law
offered no general prohibition of violence and made no
clear distinction between impermissible and permissible co-
ercion. It attempted only the regulation and humanitariza-
tion of violence once it had been initiated. Contending
belligerents were regarded as upon a plane of ''juridical
equality," and third states that chose not to participate were
said to be under a duty of "neutrality." In deep paradox,
though states were said to have a fundamental right to in-
dependent existence, there was no prohibition against states
waging war and destroying one another. Decisions were to
be taken by the relative strength of states and violence was
permissible, not only for self-help and self-vindication in the
conservation of values, but also for changing the interna-
tional distribution of values. In only less paradox, a few au-
thoritative prescriptions purported to govern the
employment of minor coercions, limited in dimension and
objective, sometimes labelled as "retorsion," "reprisal,"
"intervention," or "pacific blockade," and so forth, and
generally categorized as "measures short of war." Any such
governance was of course illusory: the initiating state could
at any time designate its operations as "war" and avoid the
thrust of limitation.
The movement in the twentieth century toward a general
prohibition of major coercion and violence, and toward a
collectivized administration of that prohibition, is traceable
through the Covenant of the League of Nations,8 the Pact of
Paris,9 and the Nuremberg Principles,1O with culmination in
7 Eugene V. Rostow, Disputes Involving the Inherent Right ofSelf-Defense, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT ACROSSROADS 264, 283 (Lori F. Damrosch ed. 1987).
Carl von Clausewitz described war as "nothing but a continuation of political inter-
course, with a mixture of other means." CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 402 (P.
Paret & M. Howard trans. 1976).
8 The Covenant, based upon the belief that World War I was started by accident,
in essence allowed nation-states the resort to war only after certain procedures of
peaceful settlement of disputes had been gone through. Cf Articles 12, 13, 15 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, June 28, 1919, 225 Conso!. T.S. 195.
9 Better known as The Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928, this Treaty, pro-
viding for the Renunciation of War had its states parties "solemnly declare ... that
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."
(art. I). Actions taken in self-defense were understood to be excluded from this pro-
hibition. Cf Quincy Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 39, 42-
43 (1933), relying heavily on the travaux priparatoires.
10 The 1945 Charter ofthe Nuremberg Tribunal ascribed individual responsibility
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the core provisions of the United Nations Charter. 11
In 1945, spurred by the "rising, common demands" of in-
dividual human beings from every corner of the globe to be
free from "the scourge of war" and for greater participation
in the shaping and sharing of all the values of human dig-
nity, the framers of the United Nations Charter made two
revolutionary changes in historic international law. The
Charter postulated, and authoritatively prescribed, both a
general prohibition against the unauthorized employment
of major coercion and violence and a new protection of the
fundamental human rights of individuals, even against their
own states}2 In its preambular clauses and the statement of
goals in Article 1, the Charter clearly recognized the inti-
mate interdependence, if not identity, of peace and human
rights and made the protection of human rights coordinate
with the maintenance of peace. In Article 2(3) the Charter
prescribed: "All members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
The most difficult problem for law in any community, a
problem greatly magnified in the global community by gross
inequalities in the distribution of effective power, is that of
characterizing and minimizing unlawful coercion and vio-
lence. In Articles 2 (4) and 51, and certain auxiliary articles,
the United Nations Charter makes an indispensable distinc-
tion between impermissible and permissible coercion and
violence and projects a set of complementary prescriptions
to protect and promote peaceful change.
Article 2 (4) states the most important of the new policies,
the general prohibition against the unauthorized use of
force. It reads: "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the
for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Cf MOORE, TIP-
SON & TURNER, supra note 6, at 73-76 (1990).
II C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967); IAN
BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAw OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1983); INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (Richard B. LiIlich ed.
1983); UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Marina Spinedi &
Bruno Simma eds. 1987).
12 It requires only brief note that for centuries international law purported to offer
little protection to the citizens of a state against that state. Traditional law exhausted
its concern for human rights as shown by the modest protection afforded aliens.
The first of these developments is described in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
1, ch. 3; the second is described in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 3, ch. 4.
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
The still primitively organized global community, offering
only modest expectation of the capability of the general
community for protecting its members, however, recognized
that some right of self-defense by states is indispensable to
the maintenance of even the most minimum public order.
Hence, Article 51 of the Charter reads: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against "a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security . . . ."
The historic right of states to self-defense did not require
them, like sitting ducks, to await actual armed attack, and it
is commonly recognized, despite the occasional literalist in-
terpretation, that the framers of the Charter had no intent to
impose suicide by precluding response to imminent attack.
That is the most rational construction of these complemen-
tary policies, contraposed in Articles 2 (4) and 51 would ap-
pear to be the right of self-defense, established by the
Charter, authorizes a state which, being the target of activi-
ties by another state, reasonably decides, as third-party ob-
servers may later determine reasonableness, that such
activities require it to employ the military instrument to pro-
tect its territorial integrity and political independence and to
use such force as may be necessary and proportionate to its
defense. 13 The employment of force which creates this ex-
pectation in the target state is in violation of Article 2 (4)
and is commonly characterized as "aggression," the unlaw-
ful complement to lawful self-defense.
Learning from the obvious difficulties in Grotius' didouble-
ment fonctionnel 14 and the failures of the League of Nations,
the framers of the Charter projected a highly collectivized
13 The detailed application of this test is outlined in MYRES s. McDoUGAL &
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, supra note I, ch. 3.
14 The same states that are claimants in one case may be sitting as judges, through
world opinion, in the next comparable case. Cf H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition
in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. I (1946); Georg Schwarzenberger, The
Grotian Factor in International Law and Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS ch. 12 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsburgh & Adam Roberts eds. (1990);
Georges Scelle, Le phinomme juridique du didoublement fonctionnel, in RECHTSFRAGEN DER
INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION: FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS WEHBERG 324 (1956).
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and centralized structure of decision-making for the detailed
administration of this basic distinction between impermissi-
ble and permissible coercion and violence. Thus, in Article
24(1), the Security Council, with its veto for the protection
of permanent members, was accorded "primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security,"
and the members of the United Nations agreed that the Se-
curity Council, "in carrying out its duties under this respon-
sibility," would act on their behalf. In other chapters of the
Charter, elaborate provision was made both for the peaceful
settlement of disputes and for employment of organized
community force in the maintenance of public order. Arti-
cle 39 authorized the Security Council to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression" and to recommend or take appropriate
measures "to maintain or restore international peace and
security." Other articles outline possible measures of vary-
ing intensity in coercion. The cap-stone provides: "The
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter."
III. TRENDS IN PAST ACHIEVEMENT OF BASIC COMMUNITY
POLICIES
The highly collectivized and centralized structure of deci-
sionmaking projected by the United Nations Charter for
characterizing and minimizing major coercion and violence
appeared, for a long time, to be still-born. So complex an
administrative structure, requiring the careful coordination
of member states, seemed not to be able to survive the vast
disparities in the effective power and interests of the mem-
ber states and the mounting intensity of the struggle be-
tween an expansive totalitarian public order and an
opposing order that at least aspired toward the values of
human dignity. As the horrors of world-wide war receded,
finding a common interest between the contending orders
became more and more difficult. The "Cold War" ensued, a
tense hegemonical strife between the two contending world
orders resulting in an unprecedented arms buildup and con-
stant states of alert.
In consequence of the long-lasting dormancy of the pro-
jected centralized structure of decisionmaking, the larger
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community of humankind was thrown back, making difficult
the distinction between impermissible and permissible coer-
cion and violence, upon Grotius' ancient didoublement fonc-
tionnel, in which the several states themselves make the
necessary evaluations and undertake appropriate sanction-
ing measures. 15 The threat or use of superpower vetoes
often stalemated the United Nations Security Council; the
General Assembly tried to fill that gap and overreached in
the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution. 16 Unsurprisingly,
states commonly made their evaluations in terms of their
own special interests, including the interests of the public
order to which they adhered. The great bulk of humankind,
however, taken as individuals, have not abandoned their de-
mand to be free from the "scourge of war," and have not
lost the realistic expectation that some stable, uniform ad-
ministration of the distinction between impermissible and
permissible coercion and violence is indispensable to even
minimum attainment of a law-governed global community.
The states of the world, and the whole of humankind as ex-
pressed through world public opinion, do continue to chal-
lenge and evaluate the behavior of states by the criteria of
Articles 2 (4) and 51.
Most recently, the rapprochement between the superpowers,
if not the partial eclipse of one of these powers, has allowed
for more multilateral solutions to problems, fostering the
hope that more centralized and more effective procedures
for the administration of an indispensable policy can still be
achieved. The unprecedented cooperation in the Security
Council during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1991 led to the use
of United Nations enforcement powers under Chapter VII
of the Charter, which had appeared obsolete to many ob-
servers for the many years of the Cold War. President Bush
has called this common action the first test of a "new world
order" based on concepts of universal collective security
15 Cf ISAAK I. DORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE SUPERPOWERS: NORMATIVE OR-
DER IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1984); ADAM ULAM, THE RIVALS: AMERICA AND RUSSIA
SINCE WORLD WAR 11(1972).
16 G.A. Res. 377A (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 20 at 10, U.N. Doc. A/I775
(1950). Cf Harry Reicher, The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of
its Passage, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1981). For a comprehensive account of
pertinent United Nations action, see N.D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (1990).
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rather than superpower rivalry and stalemate. 17 In the light
of such expectations and hope, it can scarcely be said, with
realism, that Articles 2 (4) and 51 are dead and that human-
kind is without authoritative prohibition of major coercion
and violence. 18 At least for the proponents of a public order
of human dignity, the understanding remains that the appli-
cation of major coercion and violence to the human person
is fundamentally incompatible with basic human rights and
that a global community that genuinely aspires toward the
values of human dignity must continue to seek to minimize
major coercion and violence as an instrument of change, or
as an instrument obstructing peaceful change.
A principal obstacle to the uniform application of Articles
2 (4) and 51 was the insistence, from the beginning, by the
Soviet Union that "wars of liberation" are not subject to Ar-
ticle 2 (4).19 This concept, designed to facilitate totalitarian
expansionism, is derived from an earlier idiosyncratic dis-
tinction between ''just'' and "unjust" wars. The distinction
reads:
(a) Just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of
liberation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack
and from attempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people
from capitalist slavery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and de-
pendent countries from the yoke of imperialism; and
(b) Unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and en-
slave foreign countries and foreign nations.20
The Soviets used this alleged exception to Article 2 (4) to
justify interventions in many countries in Europe, Asia, Af-
rica, and Latin America.21
In supplement to this alleged exception from Article 2 (4)
of "wars of liberation," the Soviets in more recent times
17 Cf Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth ", 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991).
18 The question was raised by Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2 (4) or: Chang-
ing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
19 Cf AZIZ HASBI, LES MOUVEMENTS DE LIBERATION NATIONALE ET LE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL (1981); JULIO ELIAS BERRIOS HERRERA, EL STATUS JURIDICO DE LOS
MOVIMIENTOS DE LlBERACI6N NACIONAL (1987); HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE By NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS (1988).
20 HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS), SHORT COURSE 167-168
(Commission ofthe Central Committee ofthe C.P.S.U.(B) ed. 1939). See also G. FAD-
DEJEW, DER MARXISMUS-LENINISMUS UBER GERECHTE UND UNGERECHTE KRIEGE (1953).
21 GALlA GOLAN, THE SOVIET UNION AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE
THIRD WORLD (1988).
HeinOnline -- 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 692 1991-1992
692 CUMBERLAND LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:681
have sought to establish an allied exception known as the
"Brezhnev Doctrine."22 This doctrine was designed to jus-
tify Soviet intervention in "socialist" states to preclude their
choice to become other than socialist. The violence with
which this doctrine was applied in Eastern Europe and else-
where needs no new description.
Now, as part of the new thinking under Gorbachev, the
Soviet Union appears happily to have explicitly given up the
Brezhnev doctrine and its support for "wars of liberation."
It should have been no cause for wonder, in an infectious
deterioration of policies and procedures for the regulation
of major coercion and violence, that the United States, as a
principal proponent of a public order of human dignity, be-
gan in measure to adopt policies and procedures parallel to
those employed by the Soviet Union. Through the Monroe
Doctrine23 and participation in the Organization of Ameri-
can States the United States has long sought to preclude
outside states from acquiring territorial power in the West-
ern hemisphere. More recently, Presidents as diverse in
general perspective as Kennedy and Johnson made pro-
nouncements, in content comparable to the later Brezhnev
Doctrine, designed to justify interventions against totalitar-
ian expansion into this hemisphere.24 In more recent times
Presidents Carter and Reagan extended comparable doc-
trines to the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. 25
22 JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE (1987); See also BORIS MEISSNER, DIE "BRESCHNEW-DoKTRIN".
DAS PRINZIP DES "PROLETARISCH-SOZIALISTISCHEN IMPERIALISMUS" UND DIE THEORIE
VON DEN VERSCHIEDENEN WEGEN ZUM SOZIALISMUS (1969); THEODOR SCHWEISFURTH,
SOZIALISTISCHES VOLKERRECHT 585-615 (1979); M. WESLEY SHOEMAKER, THE SOVIET
UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE (1986).
23 Monroe Doctrine, Annual Message to Congress of Dec. 2, 1823 (Seventh An-
nual Message) from the President, in 2 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 776 (1897). Cf JOHN BASSETT MOORE, THE
MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING (1895); DEXTER PERKINS, HANDS OFF:
A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1941); THE MONROE DOCTRINE (Armin Rap-
paport ed. 1976). For some Latin American assessments, compare INDALECIO
LIEVANO AGUIRRE, BOLIVARISMO Y MONROISMO (1987), R. NIETO-NAVIA, LA DOCTRINA
DE MONROE: PRESENCIA HISTORICA (1962), and CARLOS F. ARANGUA RIVAS, LA IN-
TERVENCI6N: DOCTRINAS DE MONROE, DRAGO Y TOBAR (1924).
24 The various pronouncements of United States officials are summarized in W.
Michael Reisman, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines
in International Law and Practice, 13 YALE]. INT'L L. 171 (1988); see also Isaak I. Dore,
The U.S. Invasion of Grenada: Resurrection of the 'Johnson Doctrine"?, 20 STAN.]. INT'L L.
173 (1984).
25 Cf W. Michael Reisman, Critical Defense Zones and International Law: The Reagan
Codicil, 76 AM.]. INT'L L. 589 (1982).
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Another important obstacle to the rational, uniform appli-
cation of Articles 2 (4) and 51 derives from an attempt to cut
down the reach of the historic right of self-defense.26 Some
state officials and scholars have taken the position that Arti-
cle 51 imposes upon states a higher degree of necessity than
that of customary international law and requires states to
await the inception of actual armed attack, without option to
respond to realistic expectations of imminent attack. This
view of Article 51 is based upon an allegedly literal interpre-
tation of the words "armed attack" regarded as an isolated
component of the article.27
It may be noted, however, that such reading introduces
the words "only if" into the Article and is contrary to all the
important canons for the interpretation of international
agreements. 28 Most importantly, the principle of effective-
ness in interpretation by major purposes makes the asserted
limitation of self-defense to the actual inception of armed
attack an absurdity. In an age of increasingly awesome in-
struments of destruction and highly sophisticated coercion
by other than military instruments, the state that finds itself
in that context and still awaits armed attack, can expect only
quick transition to oblivion. To think that an interpretation
of a prescription that would in effect impose suicide could
either create the expectations, indispensable to law, of its
enforcement or could in fact be enforced defies not merely
major purposes, but even common sense. The concept of a
customary law right of anticipatory self-defense was reaf-
firmed by the international community in its reaction to the
1967 Arab-Israeli War. Where to draw the line remains,
however, somewhat unclear given the split world reaction to
the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.29 A
comprehensive contextual analysis would provide an appro-
priate starting-point for any determination of lawfulness.
It may be recalled that the United Nations Charter makes
26 Eugene V. Rostow, supra note 7; Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules
on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1986).
27 Ian Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 266
(1962); Quincy Wright, The Cuban QJlarantine, 57 AM.]. INT'L L. 546, 560 (1963).
28 This position is fully developed in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note I, at 217,
232.
29 Cf William V. O'Brien, Israel's Attack on Osirak, 63 FREEDOM AT ISSUE 3, 4 (Nov.-
Dec. 1981); w. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack ofJune 7,
1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND.]. TRANSNAT'L
L. 417 (1982).
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the protection of human rights coordinate with, if not inclu-
sive of, its prohibition of unauthorized coercion and vio-
lence. Scholars and others are currently debating to what
degree the core provisions about human rights are, like the
provision for self-defense in Article 51, completely comple-
mentary to Article 2 (4).30 Most observers agree that Article
2 (4) does not outlaw the long enjoyed practice of humanita-
rian intervention, for the protection of a state's nationals
and sometimes others. It would thwart reason to hold that a
constitutional Charter that explicitly commits the organiza-
tion and its members to human rights should be interpreted
to abolish a historic remedy so effective in the protection of
human rights, a remedy which does not in fact threaten ter-
ritorial integrity and political independence.31
The most intense contemporary controversy centers di-
rectly upon whether it is lawful for one state to interfere (en-
gage or assist in coercion and violence) in the internal affairs
of another state. Unhappily, the discussion is carried on in
terms such as "intervention,"32 "counter-intervention,"33
30 See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter
Article 2 (4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); The Use of Force in Contemporary International
Law, 78 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 74 (1984); W. Michael Reisman, Criteriafor the Law-
ful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE]. INT'L L. 279 (1985); The Emperor Has No
Clothes: Article 2 (4) and the Use ofForce in Contemporary International Law, ch. 1 in UNITED
NATIONS FOR A BElTER WORLD 3 (J.N. Saxena et al. eds. 1986). But see Oscar
Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM.]. INT' L. 645 (1984); Oscar
Schachter, The Right ofStates to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984); Interna-
tional Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS ch. VII-VIII (1952-V); The
Role of International Law in Maintaining Peace, in ApPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLEC-
TUAL MAP ch. 5 (W. Scott Thompson et al. eds., 1988).
31 See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM.]. INT'L L. 866 (1990); R. George Wright, A Contemporary Theory ofHuman-
itarian Intervention, 4 FLA. INT'L LJ. 435 (1989).
32 C/, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., ESSAYS ON INTERVENTION (Richard F. Stranger ed.
1964); F.X. DE LIMA, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971); RJ. VINCENT,
NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1974); Lloyd N. Cutler, The Right to
Intervene, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 96 (1985); Jordan]. Paust, Conflicting Norms of Intervention:
More Variables for the Equation, 13 GA.]. INT'L & COMPo L. 305 (1983); John Norton
Moore, LEGAL STANDARDS FOR INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS, 13 GA.]. INT'L
& COMPo L. 191 (1983); Louis B. Sohn, Gradations of Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13
GA.J. INT'L & COMPo L. 225 (1983); Miner S. Ball, Ironies ofIntervention , 13 GA.]. INT'L
& COMPo L. 313 (1983); Richard Ullman, Reflections on Intervention, 52 REV. JURIDICA
U.P.R. 127 (1983); Scherle R. Schwenninger, The 1980's: New Doctrines of Intervention
or New Norms of Nonintervention?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1981).
33 Cf John A. Perkins, The Right of Counterintervention, 17 GA.]. INT'L & COMPo L.
171 (1987).
HeinOnline -- 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 695 1991-1992
1992] LA W AND PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD 695
"civil war,"34 "self-determination,"35 "spheres of influ-
ence,"36 "reprisals,"37 "retaliations,"38 and so on, which
make so ambiguous a reference to both facts and legal poli-
cies, that what is being asserted is often difficult to know.
One suggestion appears to be that the self-determination of
states is the paramount policy of contemporary international
law and that the proponents of human dignity may intervene
in other states to protect or promote self-determination,
even as totalitarian states do in promotion of totalitarian
public order. In response, other commentators insist that
such intervention would be in clear violation of the allegedly
literal and neutral words of Article 2 (4). In a counter-
response, the proponents of human dignity insist that they
may lawfully intervene after, but not before, expansive totali-
tarian intervention in a state. In such controversy it is some-
times forgotten that what is involved in all instances is the
application of the larger community's fundamental policy, as
embodied in Articles 2 (4) and 51, against change by unau-
thorized coercion and violence and that the underlying
objectives of a state, whether for expansion or conservation,
are among the most important features of the factual con-
text for evaluating the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a state's
action.
The rational application of Articles 2 (4) and 51, in clarifi-
cation of common interest, requires in every instance of
challenged coercion and violence, not mere logical deriva-
tion from allegedly autonomous (policy neutral) rules, but
rather a careful, configurative examination and appraisal of
the many relevant features of the larger context of the coer-
34 Cf Steven C. Greer, Military Intervention in Civil Disturbances: The Legal Basis Re-
considered, PuB. L. 573 (1983).
35 Cf w. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article
2 (4),78 AM.j. INT'L L. 642 (1984). But see Oscar Schachter, The Legality ofPro-Demo-
cratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984).
36 Cf w. Michael Reisman, Critical Defense Zones and International Law: The Reagan
Codicil, 76 AM. j. INT'L L. 589 (1982).
37 Cf Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Anned Force, 66 AM. j. INT'L L. I,
22 (1972); QUINCY WRIGHT, ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF CIVIL WAR (Richard
A. Falk ed. 1971); FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971); Barry Leven-
reid, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self Defense and Reprisal Under Modern
International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 28 (1982); Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in
Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE WEST.
RES.j. INT'L L. 243 (1987).
38 Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. j.
INT'L L. 415 (1969).
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cion and violence.39 For example, in relevant prescription
the customary right to use force in self-defense is limited by
the criterion of necessity to defend against an imminent, or
exercised, use of force against the territorial integrity of a
state or its political independence, and by the requirement
of proportionality of the action taken in self-defense. Thus,
the action defended against has to be appraised in its entire
context: the participants have to be determined as well as
their objectives (e.g., whether they are expansionist or con-
servative in nature), the situation of decision, the bases of
power behind the activities, the strategies employed, and
their immediate outcomes in intensities of coercion. If the
activities complained of would lead a disinterested third
party reasonably to condude that use of the military instru-
ment is urgently required to protect the target country's ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence, then the target
country may employ force in a reasonably proportionate re-
sponse-the proportionality of the defensive action, again,
being determined through comprehensive contextual analy-
sis. What the proponents ofa public order of human dignity
cannot accept is that a double standard be established that
discriminates in favor of expansive totalitarianism.40
With the expansive totalitarian bloc disintegrating (con-
trary to the bedrock assumptions of many people), and
many communities enjoying a new freedom, the global fo-
cus may shift to new problems and solutions. The chances
for multilateral solutions through the international security
system of the United Nations could improve. A very recent
example is the United Nations Security Council authoriza-
tion of the use of force by a group of states to drive Iraq out
of illegally attacked and annexed Kuwait. Skillful diplomacy
by the Bush Administration secured worldwide acceptance
of a U.N.-sanctioned, but not U.N.-conducted multinational
39 This position is believed to be established in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra
note 1, ch. 3.
40 The importance of criteria of "common interest" to law was stressed by Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in a profound and eloquent address to the General
Assembly on September 25, 1990. In demanding a "universal human yardstick of
good and evil," he stated, inter alia, with respect to the United Nations' condemna-
tion oflraq's invasion of Kuwait: "An approach based on common interest does not
permit any other course of action. From now on the world community intends to act
by a single standard." U.N. Doc. A/45/PV.6, at 46, 47; see also Excerpts From
Shevardnadu's u.N. Address Calling/or Iraq to Q!,lit Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at
AlO.
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police action under the leadership of the United States. Ob-
viously, the role of the United States in forging the virtually
universal consensus on the justness of the Gulf War cannot
be underestimated.· Even though the U.N. and its other
member countries at times appeared to be reduced to the
role of pawns in the global chess game, the very fact that the
United States secured authorization for its coalition's meas-
ures from the U.N. Security Council gives a boost to the col-
lective enforcement powers under the United Nations
Charter. The price of going it alone was considered to be
too high, and collective action was considered to be achieva-
ble since the prospect of superpower vetoes were eliminated
through the use of backdoor diplomacy and the carrot,
rather than the stick, approach.
The specter of a Pax Americana in the sense of the United
States acting as a vigilante on the world scene, trying to en-
force law and order against rogue tyrants or outlaw commu-
nities, is thus a less likely prospect than a benign American
preeminence in the insistence upon negotiated solutions to
festering problems. This tendency can be seen in the Bush
Administration's drive toward a Middle East Peace Confer-
ence and a resolution to the Greco-Turkish dispute over
Cyprus.
With the rising probability of internationally conducted
or, at least, condoned, enforcement action, the question
arises as to whether the taking of, or discussion of, pertinent
Security Council measures supersedes or in any way impairs
individual or collective rights of self-defense of the attacked
nation and its friends. An argument could be made that
self-defense becomes unnecessary once collective security
measures have been taken or are contemplated.41 This rea-
soning, however, overlooks the fact that the collective secur-
ity system will work only if the Article 51-customary law
option remains operational. Otherwise, if individual action
were disallowed each time a threat to peace is debated in the
U.N. Security Council, needed timely individual acts of self-
defense might be thwarted and, in effect, suicide imposed.
International processes take time and are highly politicized.
The victim of an attack may be on clearer and more solid
legal ground if international bodies authorize the use of de-
41 Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, supra note 18, at 63-64; see also Oscar
Schachter, United Nations Law in the GulfConflict, 85 AM.]' INT'L L. 452, 457-61 (1991).
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fensive force, but that authorization cannot and should not
take away the right of the attacked community to defend it-
self or the right of its friend to come to its rescue. A differ-
ent result might be acceptable if there were an international
police force that could act swiftly and without need for Se-
curity Council authorization in each individual case of ag-
gression. The international system, in its present stage of
development, however, does not provide a "policeman at
the corner" who could ensure security, obviating the need
for a state's inherent right to self-defense.42
Besides the universal level, there are regional collective
security systems whose enforcement actions are recognized
by the United Nations Charter.43 In particular, the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) has legitimized, inter alia,
military action undertaken in the Western hemisphere.44 In-
terestingly, the European Community has undertaken to
mediate in the Yugoslavian conflict, underscoring the Com-
munity's progression from a mere economic union to a re-
gional political organization-extending its scope of action
beyond its constituting treaties to a non-member state, and
beyond the economic sphere to the area of security. Invita-
tions to intervene, especially when extended by not yet es-
42 Cf w. Michael Reisman, Some Lessons From Iraq: International Law and Democratic
Politics, 16 YALE]' INT'L L. 203 (1991); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement
Action or Collective Self-Defense, 85 AM.]. INT'L L. 506, 510-514 (1991). See also
john Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA.]' INT'L L.
403 (1991).
43 Cf Articles 52 and 53. Domingo Acevedo, Collective Self-Defense and the Use of
Regional or Subregional Authority as Justification for the Use of Force, 78 PROC. AM. SOC'y
INT'L L. 69-74 (1984); Marvin G. Goldman, Comment, Action by the Organization of
American States: When is Security Council Authorization Required Under Article 53 of the
United Nations Charter?, 10 UCLA L. REV. 837 (1963).
44 Compare the United States' naval blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis, contextu-
ally analyzed by Myres S. McDougal in The Soviet-Cuban Qp,arantine and Self-Defense, 57
AM. j. INT'L L. 597 (1963); see also GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: Ex-
PLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971); ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS (1974); ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS (1969); NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV,
KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS 493-504 (1970); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS
(1965); THEODORE SORENSEN, KENNEDY (1965); Todd Cranshaw, A Test for Freedom:
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, I ST. THOMAS L.F. I (1988). Another example would
be the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic. See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 (1967). Controversy surrounded the claim by the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), as a regional organization, to call
on the United States to intervene in Grenada. Compare JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAw
AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984) with Christopher C. joyner, Reflections on the Lawful-
ness of Invasion, 78 AM.]' INT'L L. 131 (1984). See also Ved P. Nanda, The United States
Armed Intervention in Grenada-Impact on World Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 395, 409
(1984).
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tablished governments, have, in some instances, been
received with skepticism by the international community.45
IV. THE CONDITIONS AFFECTING PAST ACHIEVEMENT OF
BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES
In considering the conditions that have affected past fail-
ures in humankind's achievement of a stable minimum pub-
lic order, we have to analyze a maze of interacting
predispositional and environmental variables.46 The predis-
positional variables are the subjectivities of individual
human beings, including their demands for values, their
identifications with others, and their expectations about the
context of social interaction. These relevant subjectivities
may be organized by employment of the maximization pos-
tulate that individuals adopt one response rather than an-
other when they expect to be better off in terms of all their
values by the response chosen. The environmental vari-
ables are the features of the larger community context which
condition and constrain predispositions.
As previously noted, a most important variable in the con-
temporary global process of effective power is what is com-
monly referred to as "the rising, common demands" of
peoples for greater participation in the shaping and sharing
of all the basic human dignity values. Different peoples,
conditioned by differing cultural traditions and modes of so-
cial organization, may of course pursue and achieve the
same basic values through different modalities and nuances
in institutional practice. Unhappily, in a world of immense
contrasts in degrees and directions of development, peoples
nurtured in differing parochial communities may tend to ex-
press special, rather than common, interests. Unable to
clarify and agree upon common interests, peoples often be-
come preoccupied with short-term, immediate payoffs
rather than long-term consequences. As the respect revolu-
tion accelerates, peoples' demands for new participation in
the different value processes may become more realistic in
45 Compare the Soviet Union's 1980 invasion ofAfghanistan, its 1956 occupation of
Hungary, and the crushing of the Prague uprising in 1968; but consider the 1989 U.S.
occupation of Panama. For a general overview, see Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal
Validity ofMilitary Intervention By Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189
(1985).
46 These variables are outlined, and described in some detail, in MYRES S. McDou-
GAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, supra note 3, ch. 1.
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recognition of the need for reciprocity in promotion of com-
mon interest. The universalizing demands of individuals for
greater participation in all value processes can be expected
to continue to affect all effective and authoritative decisions.
The identifications upon which demands for values are as-
serted today range from the whole of humankind to small
parochial groups. The earliest parochial identifications with
the family and the tribe were broken, in part, by the advent
of cities, facilitating later identifications with larger states.
In more recent times, the "nation-state" has been the sym-
bol around which individuals could organize their collective
identifications.47 Most elites who base their power largely
on the symbol of the "state" have, of course, sought to in-
hibit more inclusive identifications that might limit their
power. However, the potentialities for individuals to ac-
quire and sustain more inclusive identifications, at least for
the promotion of minimum order appears to be strengthen-
ing. The increasing tempo of interaction in all value
processes about the globe, facilitated by modern communi-
cation and transportation, allows an individual not merely to
change geographic location, but also to change "place"
through identifications with many different functional
groups. Individuals who participate in a vast global network
of territorial and functional activities may be better able to
identify with a common humanity and to demand its com-
mon interest. Nevertheless, aggression may turn out to be a
constant of human behavior.48 Respected Freudian theory
assumes the existence of destructive alongside constructive
tendencies. Continued violence, on an inter-state level,
would thus come as no surprise.49 We might see, and in fact
are seeing, resurgences of parochial, nationalist, and funda-
47 For a history of membership in the various types of territorial communities, see
SIEGFRIED WIESSNER, DIE FUNKTION DER STAATSANGEHORIGKEIT 85-109 (1989).
48 Cf KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (1966). According to Lorenz, aggression,
defined as the "fighting instinct in beast and man which is directed against members
of the same species," id. at ix is phylogeneticallly programmed, not learned human
behavior. [d. at 29, 237. This view is sharply attacked by Kim, The Lorenzian Theory of
Aggression and Peace Research: A Critique, in, THE WAR SYSTEM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
ApPROACH 84-107 (Richard A. Falk & S. Kim eds. 1980); see also F. HARTMANN, THE
CONSERVATION OF ENEMIES: A STUDY IN ENMITY (1982).
49 DEAN G. PRUITT & RICHARD C. SNYDER, THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES
OF WAR (1969); CHARLES REYNOLDS, THE POLITICS OF WAR: A STUDY OF THE RATION-
ALITY OF VIOLENCE IN INTER-STATE RELATIONS (1989); JOHN G. STOESSINGER, WHY
NATIONS Go To WAR (4th ed. 1985).
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mentalist tendencies. Even so, demands for minimum and
optimum world public order are likely to intensify.
As to some of the more important environmental vari-
ables that characterize the global community process, the
following observations are in order.50
In the area of security, we note the following: a signifi-
cantly reduced level of confrontation between former super-
powers, with diminishing expectations of cataclysmic
violence; an attenuation, if not elimination, of the East-
West conflict, but a possible exacerbation of North-South
and regional conflicts; threats of nuclear destruction and of
chemical and biological warfare; the acquisition of contem-
porary instruments of destruction by smaller powers; and
the rise and spread of private violence and terrorism.
The world's population is increasing at an accelerating
rate. People are ever more unevenly distributed in relation
to resources and ever higher barriers to migration are
erected.
Resources, commonly referred to as "the environment,"
are spoiled, polluted and exhausted at an accelerating rate.
New global threats to the environment are emerging, such
as global warming, ozone layer depletion, etc. Increasingly,
sharable resources are monopolized, with restraint upon sci-
entific inquiry about resources. Deliberate and accidental
climate and weather modification constitute both a promise
and a threat. Significant resources continue to be diverted
to destructive purposes.
The antiquated nation-state structures as well as weak in-
ternational governmental organizations continue to persist,
while significant, functional, transnational associations de-
voted to values other than power and wealth fail to emerge.
Wealth and other private associations remain largely immu-
nized from transnational authority.
As to particular value processes within the global commu-
nity processes, we recognize, with respect to power, the rise
of democracy and the retreat of totalitarianism within many
communities. As to wealth, we note the following: contin-
ued prevalence of individual poverty; unequal distribution
of wealth both within and across community lines; inade-
quate regulation of transnational monetary units; govern-
50 This presentation is adapted from Myres S. McDougal, International Law and the
Future, 50 MISS. LJ. 259 (1979). More recent developments are taken into account.
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mental interferences with private trade; irrational
allocations of resources and unequal development of re-
sources; and continuing. cycles of depression and inflation.
Concerning the value of respect, we observe widespread
denials of individual freedom of choice about social roles;
increasing individual differentiations and group hatreds
upon grounds such as race, sex, religion, language, national
origin-all irrelevant to individual capabilities and contribu-
tions; and massive encroachments upon individual auton-
omy and privacy through modern technology and increasing
governmental bureaucratization.
As regards well-being, a high mortality rate and low life
expectancy continue to prevail in many parts of the world.
Incidents of famine, epidemics, and deadly disease are on
the increase. Indiscriminate mass killings in armed conflict
and other interactions are to be noted as well as the phe-
nomenon of unexplained disappearances. Torture becomes
ever more fashionable as a deliberate instrument of policy.
With respect to enlightenment, high rates of illiteracy and
differential access to information persist in many communi-
ties. Deliberate fabrications of fact and disseminations of
misinformation occur. We also note the unequal distribu-
tion of skills in modern technology and the rapid obsoles-
cence of skills by changes in technology. Developing
countries continue to suffer from brain drain to the devel-
oped. There are also restrictions upon the freedoms of
skilled groups to organize and to function.
Loyalty in the name of the state continues to be required,
resulting in the undermining of more universal loyalties.
Severe restrictions upon freedom of association persist.
Congenial personal relations are often frustrated by govern-
mental action and sanctioned by social ostracism. Increas-
ingly, human beings identify themselves with severely
limited groups.
Freedom of worship and choices among secular criteria of
responsibility are still often denied, and rectitude is
politicized. Messianic religious fundamentalism is on the
rise. On the other hand, we note continuing intolerance and
persecution of religious minorities.
The intense interdependences among all the predisposi-
tional and environmental conditions make it possible to ef-
fect changes in the larger global community process,
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including movement toward a more stable minimum public
order, by making changes in, and managing, any of the vari-
ous particular conditions.
V. PROBABLE FUTURES IN ACHIEVEMENT OF BASIC
COMMUNITY POLICIES
Law concerns itself with the past and the present in aid of
anticipating and shaping the future. Even in relation to a
problem as difficult as that of establishing and maintaining a
stable minimum world public order, the projection of possi-
ble futures, when inspired and disciplined by knowledge of
past trends of achievement and their conditioning factors,
may serve to stimulate creativity in the invention and evalua-
tion of improved alternatives in decisions. One procedure
for inquiry about the future, invented by Harold Lasswell, is
that of deliberately formulating provisional maps of "devel-
opmental constructs" of future possibilities that range
through a broad spectrum, from the most optimistic to the
most pessimistic.51 When this method of inquiry is applied
to the problem of minimum world public order, the contrast
in rival constructs is stark.
The most optimistic developmental construct projects in-
creasing progress toward a wider and more responsible
sharing of power and a greater production and wider shar-
ing in all the values of human dignity among the peoples of
the world. This construct builds upon various assumptions
about predispositional and environmental variables and
their interaction. It projects that the widespread demands
of peoples for a greater and more rewarding participation in
all value processes will not diminish, but will rather inten-
sify. Further, it projects that the contemporary largely paro-
chial identifications of peoples may, despite recurrent
phases of fragmentation, expand toward recognition, not
merely of common humanity, but of shared community, and
that peoples will achieve increasingly realistic perceptions
of, and expectations about, their indissoluble interdepen-
dences in the shaping and sharing of all values. It projects
51 HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935); THE
WORLD REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME: A FRAMEWORK FOR BASIC POLICY RESEARCH
(1951). See also Eulau, H.D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis, II WEST. POL. Q 229
(1958); WILLIAM ASCHER, FORECASTING: AN ApPRAISAL FOR POLIcy-MAKERS AND
PLANNERS (1978).
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also, among environmental variables, the following assump-
tions: that the accelerating rate of population growth can be
controlled; that the resource-environment of the world can
be protected from exhaustion and spoliation; that science
and science-based technology can create vast new resources;
that more economic, governmental and value-functional in-
stitutions can be created, and so on.
The most pessimistic developmental construct regards
the direction of history as reversing itself and moving to-
ward an aggregate of militarized and garrisoned communi-
ties, each controlled from the center and modelled on the
prison. This trend could culminate in an all comprehensive,
single totalitarian state, with a system of public order that,
when finally entrenched, organizes the global community
into a vast hierarchical pattern under the rule of a self-
perpetuating military caste. This construct builds upon the
following assumptions from among predispositional vari-
ables: that the peoples of the world will not be able to clar-
ify their genuine common interests, but will rather pursue
short-term special and exclusive advantages; that the identi-
fications of peoples will remain territorially bound and paro-
chial, rather than extending to a common humanity; and
that peoples' expectations will in general remain diffuse,
truncated, and unrealistic, and include, in particular, an an-
ticipation that violence will be so high and pervasive as to
provide a chronic justification for the continuing military
mobilization of humankind. The assumptions made in this
construct about environmental variables are of course
largely the opposite of those that sustain the optimistic con-
struct. Even the natural resource environment could con-
spire with other factors to make life nasty, brutish, and
short. In added pessimistic expectation, technological fac-
tors could make achieving the community control of nuclear
and biological weapons that is necessary to their legal regu-
lation impossible.
Whatever mid-extreme constructs that may be drawn be-
tween these two extremes, most observers today agree that
contemporary world public order is undergoing transforma-
tions of unprecedented magnitude and scope and that such
change is likely to continue at an accelerating rate. Happily,
any particular developmental construct is not inevitable in
outcome. The future may, in ways about which we do not
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yet know, be inevitable, but statements about the future,
made in the light of present knowledge, cannot fathom the
inevitable and may be accorded differing degrees of
probability, subject to change. This indeterminacy of the fu-
ture presents the proponents of a world public order of
human dignity with the opportunity, as well as the desperate
necessity, to refashion the global constitutive process of au-
thoritative decision in modalities better designed to secure
both minimum public order and other community de-
manded values.
The struggle between contending ideological world or-
ders appears to be receding, if not vanishing. Broad
realignments are possible probably along economic lines.
The G-7 is a possible model for the restructuring of the Se-
curity Councilor similar inclusive authorities providing for
an effective international security system.52 The first, uncer-
tain steps of the unified Germany on the world scene make
an accurate prediction of its future role somewhat difficult.
It, as well as Japan, will probably be included, and playa
large role, in any inclusive security system. The North-
South and regional conflicts will continue unabated, if not
exacerbated, through the combined effects of the burdens of
international debt,53 overpopulation, environmental spolia-
tion and the pursuit of special interests.
VI. ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVED ACHIEVEMENT
The optimalization postulate, assuming that individuals
act within their capabilities to maximize their values, and the
many historic successes of law as an instrument for the clari-
fication of common interest, would suggest that by appro-
priate modifications in perspectives the peoples of the world
can be encouraged to move toward both the establishment
of more effective decision processes and the making of more
rational specific decisions about public order values. It is
hardly a novel thought that these factors-culture, class, in-
terest, personality, and crisis-which importantly condition
peoples' perspectives can be modified to foster constructive
rather than destructive perspectives.
There are of course multitudinous modalities in institu-
52 W. Michael Reisman, International Law After the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 859
(1990); see also WILLIAM K. DOMKE, WAR AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL SYSTEM (1988).
53 Cf GEORGE MACESICH, WORLD DEBT AND STABILITY (1991).
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tion and policy that might be employed, if appropriate per-
spectives could be created in the peoples of the world, to
move the existing global process of authoritative decision
toward a more secure, free, and abundant world public or-
der. For centuries philosophers, clerics and kings have prof-
fered plans for perpetual peace.54 Contemporary proposals
abound for various forms of world government and lesser
modifications of existing institutions and practices.55
In the absence of comprehensive and detailed studies, it is
difficult to offer a definitive illustration of the changes in
policies and measures that might transform the existing
global constitutive process into a more effective instrument
of minimum and optimum orders. Highly impressionistic
suggestions of the kinds of policies and measures that could,
in appropriate context, point in the direction of a more se-
cure, free, and abundant world public order may, however,
be possible.56 We proceed phase by phase through the fea-
tures of existing global constitutive process.
A. Participation in Decision-Making
We should seek a more genuinely representative and re-
sponsible balancing of power through the creation of more
rational and effective intergovernmental regional organiza-
tions. We should encourage the creation of political parties,
pressure groups, and private associations, dedicated to all
values, for participation in transnational activities and legal
functions. We should recognize the importance of the indi-
54 For an overview see McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, ch. 4, in particular,
at 263-66.
55 For an introduction to the literature, see RICHARD A. FALX, EXPLORATIONS AT THE
EDGE OF TIME: THE PROSPECT FOR WORLD ORDER (1992); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, A
COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO WORLD PEACE (1985); S. MENDLOVITZ, ON THE CREATION
OF A JUST WORLD ORDER: PREFERRED WORLDS FOR THE 1990's (1975); JOSEPH A.
MIKUS, BEYOND DETERRENCE: FROM POWER POLITICS TO WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1988); JOHN A. PERKINS, THE PRUDENT PEACE (1981); ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIV-
ING WITHOUT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (Bums H. Weston ed. 1990); THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES, COMMON SECURITY: A
BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL (1982); THE UNITED NATIONS AND A JUST WORLD ORDER
(Richard A. Falk, Samual S. Kim & Saul H. Mendlovitz eds. 1991); Richard A. Falk, A
New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE LJ. 969
(1975). See also HIDEMI SUGANAMI, THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY AND WORLD ORDER PRO-
POSALS (1989).
56 In his address before the United Nations General Assembly of September 25,
1990, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze outlined many potentially effective reforms. See
supra note 41. He emphasized the need for control of armaments, nuclear testing,
and the production of chemical and biological weapons.
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vidual human being, as ultimate actor in all organizations,
through provision of increasing access to all authoritative
arenas and functions.
B. Perspectives: Basic General Community Policies
It is crucial to reinforce our commitment to minimum or-
der, i.e. that no change be effected by unauthorized coer-
cion and violence, by explicit recognition of the
complementarity of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter, while emphasizing a broad conception of self-
defense. Article 2 (4) should be interpreted to prohibit ex-
pansionist activities. Article 51 should continue to be read
to authorize states to take measures in self-defense when at-
tack is imminent, without necessity for awaiting the fact of
armed attack. A right of humanitarian intervention should
be recognized. It should be strictly limited in purpose and
scope, temporary in duration, and subject to the require-
ments of international responsibility of intervening parties.
Also, our commitment to optimum order should be rein-
forced by consolidating the emergence of a global bill of
human rights through appropriate application of the Char-
ter, the major covenants, national decisions, and customary
behavior.
C. Arenas: Structures of Authority
Structures of authority should be balanced in geographic
range between centralized and decentralized, and integrated
in a way to take into account the intensity of reciprocal im-
pacts within different geographic areas. The scope and au-
thority of the executive within international governmental
organizations should be expanded. Panels of skilled experts
for the voluntary settlement of disputes by mediation, con-
ciliation, arbitration or adjudication should be provided.
With modern technology, these panels could be moved
quickly about the world for sessions in convenient locations.
Compulsory jurisdiction for adjudication might be in-
creased with respect to matters not directly involving state
security.
D. Bases of Power
The promotion of minimum and optimum order might be
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enhanced by a more pluralistic distribution of both authority
and effective control.
1. Authority
Insofar as compatible with the genuine security interests
of states, claims of "political questions" and "domestic ju-
risdiction" that immunize activities from legal evaluation,
should be rejected. To protect inclusive interests, inclusive
institutions should be accorded a more ample competence
with respect to the intelligence, promotion, appraisal, and
invocation functions; with respect to the prescription, appli-
cation, and termination functions, they should be accorded
a broad competence on matters that do not endanger the
security of states. The separate states should be allocated
the competence necessary to protect their exclusive inter-
ests, and settle conflicts between themselves by the criteria
of reasonableness as determined through a disciplined, sys-
tematic examination of the features of the larger context
that affects both exclusive and inclusive interests.
2. Control
Through coalition, alliance, and regionalization, the con-
trol of the resource bases of the earth-space community
should be more rationally organized. By agreement and
unilateral action, the resources being devoted to armaments
and military purposes should be reduced. Multiple net-
works of transnational associations, governmental and pri-
vate, should be expanded to increase the greater production
and wider sharing of all the values that affect power, as well
as the quality of life. Educational institutions should be en-
couraged to increase their inquiries about the conditions,
policies, and alternatives necessary to an improved world
public order. The technologies of modern communication
should be employed to promote a world public opinion that
demands and sustains a public order of human dignity.
E. Strategies: Authoritative Procedures
We should strive for an appropriate integration in sup-
port of public order of all strategies-diplomatic, ideologi-
cal, economic, and military-with a strong emphasis upon
persuasion rather than coercion. In revival of Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter, our goal should be to collec-
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tivize and centralize such coercion as may be necessary and
proportionate to the maintenance of public order. The dip-
lomatic instrument should be enhanced by minimizing the
employment, other than in relation to matters affecting the
security of states, of special majorities and vetoes, and by
rationalizing the law of international agreements. Free
transnational channels of communication should be main-
tained for more effective employment of the ideological in-
strument. The economic instrument should be used to
improve the channels of trade, financial assistance, and de-
velopment in the greater production and wider distribution
of goods and services. In performance of decision func-
tions, the best available scientific procedures should be uti-
lized to explore facts and potential policies, and make
findings as contextual, dependable, and creative as possible.
In prescriptive and applicative decision, the final characteri-
zation of facts and policies should be deliberate, rational in
relation to goals, and non-provocative, employing contex-
tual analysis in evaluation and choice of alternatives.
CONCLUSION
A fundamental restructuring of the world social and con-
stitutive process is taking place before our very eyes. The
host of national "reawakenings" and redefinitions of com-
munities amount to revolution on the global scale. Eternal
peace,57 however, is not imminent. Immanuel Kant's dream
is not likely to be realized soon because of the continuing
fierce struggles among peoples for wealth, power and other
desired values. What we see, with pleasure, though, is that
peoples, increasingly, are taking control of their destinies.
Individual human beings are demanding more power, more
wealth, more influence over their lives-and they are getting
it. The current situation in Haiti may be but one retarding
event in the global move toward peoples' taking ever
greater control of the shaping and sharing of the values of
human dignity.
We may contribute, through thorough contextual analysis
of problems of minimum world public order, and blueprints
for reform, to closely approximate the optimum order of the
57 Cf IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY (C. Smith trans.
1903).
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full realization of our human potential. To guide in this
quest, however, a leader of the stature of Cordell Hull is
sorely needed.
